AA lento-onnettomuus Jamaikalla

[Nils Rostedt 13]

Alustavien tutkintatietojen mukaan koneen kosketus kiitotiehen osui noin 1220 metriä (4000 jalkaa) kynnyksestä. Kiitotien pituus on 2714 metriä eli pysähtymismatkaa jäi 1495 metriä.

 

Koneen ilmanopeus oli 148 solmua [tuntuu isolta] ja maanopeus myötätuulen avittamana 162 solmua. Myötätuulikomponentti oli siis 14 solmua. Kone teki yhden pompun, ja spoilerit, reverssit ja autobrake toimivat normaalisti.

 

Kun kone poistui ulos märältä kiitotieltä, sen nopeus oli vielä 63 solmua. Toistaiseksi ei ole löydetty mekaanista vikaa tms. joka olis voinut olla onnettomuuden syynä.

 

Linkki

 

Spekulaatiota: Myötätuulta, kosketus pitkäksi, ehkä pientä ylinopeutta, ja liukas märkä kiitotie... siinäpä tarvittavat osatekijät joiden yhteisvaikutuksesta kone entiseksi. Onneksi ei kuolonuhreja.

[Ilkka Mäkelä 1 209]

Raportti tästäkin tapauksesta on valmistunut, sisältää n. 290 sivua, mutta yhteenveto löytyy Avheraldista.

 

5) The flight crew decided to land in heavy rain on a wet runway in a tailwind close to the tailwind landing limit.

 

6) The flight crew did not perform an adequate landing distance assessment.

 

7) The flight crew did not use the RNAV (GPS) Rwy 30 approach, and land into wind on runway 30.

 

8 - The flight crew initially briefed to land with autobrake 2, then changed this to autobrake 3 on final approach, whereas “MAX autobrakes or manual braking” was the recommended American Airlines procedure for the conditions.

 

9) The flight crew did not plan for “the most adverse conditions”, as instructed in the American Airlines B737 Aircraft Operating Manual.

 

10) The flight crew elected to land with flap 30, rather than the flap 40 recommended for short field and tailwind wind landing in the AA B737 Operating Manual (See 1.17.1.1.8).

 

11) The flight crew did not adjust their landing plan to the rapidly changing weather conditions.

 

12) The flight crew did not select the most suitable runway for landing.

 

13) The captain did not disengage the autothrottle when he disengaged the autopilot, nor was this required per AA SOPs, although it was part of Boeing recommended procedures.

 

14) The aircraft crossed the runway threshold 20 feet above the ideal height, and landed long.

 

15) The captain did not follow the company SOPs for landing technique and go-around.

 

16) The captain did not follow company recommendations for landing configuration, for landing with a tailwind and on a wet runway, or for the landing profile to be flown.

 

17) The captain pitched the nose of the aircraft up when passing over the threshold, resulting in the aircraft floating in the flare, then landing long.

 

18) The first officer did not provide all the necessary and appropriate monitoring and CRM input during the flight, especially during the final stages of the landing.

 

19) The aircraft touched down at 4,100 feet from the runway threshold.

 

20) The flight crew planned to land the aircraft without determining the runway surface condition and the braking action.

 

21) The aircraft did not land within the desired touchdown point or within the touchdown zone.

 

22) There was a 14 knot tailwind component when the aircraft landed.

 

23) The aircraft touched down at Vref plus 5 knots, thus increasing the landing distance required.

 

24) The flight crew did not conduct a go-around when the long landing made this necessary.

 

.. ja niin edelleen. Vastakkaiseen suuntaan olisi voinut laskeutua RNAV(GPS)-menetelmää käyttäen, jolloin onnettomuus olisi todennäköisesti vältetty. Muutenkin näyttää siltä, ettei lentäjillä ollut homma oikein hallussa?

 

http://avherald.com/h?article=424a11b1/0004&opt=0

[Jaakko Polet 6]

Juu ei todellakaan ole hallussa jos ei vedetä ylös kilometrin pituisen ''hyllyn'' aikana

[Hannu Örn 7]

31) The flight crew members were possibly fatigued after being on duty for nearly 12 hours, and awake for more than 14 hours.