Deltan kone laskeutui ennen kynnystä.

[Mikko Tuomi 390]

17 tuntia sitten, Tatu Koiranen kirjoitti:

Joo, asetusmuutos 2020/1176 jolla tuo säädettiin, tuli voimaan 12.8.2021. FAA:lla taisi ehtiä olla vaatimus jo aika pitkään aiemmin?

Niin ja tervetuloa Fight..eiku Flightforumille

Tuo factored/unfactored landing distance on ollut kaytossa niin kauan kun ite olen lentanyt 121 hommia, eli ainakin 5 vuotta.

 

[Seppo Kohonen 311]

Tutkinta on aloitettu 19.1.2023. Tuloksia saataneen odottaa jonkin aikaa. Esim "Runway excursion, Dornier 228-212, PH-CGN, Eindhoven Airport" tutkinta kesti aika tarkkaan kaksi vuotta.

https://www.onderzoeksraad.nl/en/page/22052/touchdown-before-threshold-airbus-a330-300-amsterdam-airport-schiphol

 

Muokattu: Helmikuu 13, 2023, käyttäjä: Seppo Kohonen

[Seppo Kohonen 311]

Hollannin Onnettomuustutkintakeskus on julkaissut tutkinnan tulokset.

67-sivuinen elostus löytyy englanniksi: https://onderzoeksraad.nl/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/Touchdown-before-threshold-Risks-associated-with-a-large-aircraft-landing-on-a-short-runway-1.pdf

Lyhyesti:

"Despite Runway 22’s sufficient length of 2,020 metres for an A330-300 landing, the flight crew perceived the runway length as short. This influenced their approach strategy."

"Key Factors Leading to the Incident

Manual Control and Trajectory Alteration:
The captain manually controlled the aircraft’s flight path after disengaging the autopilot at 240 ft radio altitude, allowing a descent below the ILS glide slope and PAPI glide path.

Flight Crew’s Preoccupation with Runway Length:
The crew focused on speed management more than maintaining the glide path due to concerns about a potential overrun.

Environmental Challenges:
The aircraft encountered a wind gust and downdraft at approximately 60 ft above ground level, altering its trajectory and leading to an early touchdown before the runway threshold.

ILS and PAPI System Limitations:
The ILS and PAPI system on Runway 22, designed for smaller aircraft, did not meet the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) and European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) criteria for a minimum threshold crossing height for the A330-300’s main landing gear, contributing to the reduced safety margin.

Human Factors and Operator’s Risk Management:
The crew’s collective judgment was shaped by their perception of the risks associated with a runway overrun, which overshadowed the risk of an undershoot.

Additionally, ambiguities in the operator’s Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) and a limited specific training for landing on short runways like Runway 22 led to deviations from intended procedures. Fatigue factors, analysed in Appendix F, suggest the captain and both first officers may have been affected. This may have impacted their cognitive functions and decision-making during the critical phases of flight, despite the operator’s comprehensive fatigue risk management system."